Virtue

Speaking about virtue, Cicero said, Cicero begins Book III by asserting that “pleasure has been eliminated from the inquiry, and pretty much the same objections hold against those who maintained that the ultimate good was freedom from pain. Indeed no good should be declared supreme if it is lacking in virtue, since nothing can be superior to that” (On Moral Ends 3.2, tr. Woolf). Epicureans were wrong to choose virtue for the sake of pleasure, since virtue should be chosen for the sake of itself; this follows because virtue’s value is intrinsic to itself, not in its use regarding something else, just as honey is intrinsically sweet, not in relation to something else, but as a defining characteristic of its nature; its sweetness is part of what it is. In contrast, a screwdriver’s value is not intrinsic, but instrumental; it is only valuable in relation to something else, like something needing screwing or unscrewing.

Virtue’s goodness is like honey’s sweetness. And this is exactly where the Epicureans fall short, for they say we should choose virtuous acts for the sake of pleasure, making virtue like a screwdriver, a means to an end. And it is here where Cicero agrees with the Stoics that morality and virtue are intrinsically valuable; that moral and virtuous acts should be chosen for their own sake and not for the sake of something else.

According to the Stoic philosophy, virtue is good and vice is bad, everything else is indifferent. In other words, if it does not have to do with virtue or vice, it is irrelevant to value, except insofar as it might have instrumental value towards virtue or vice. It is virtue that necessarily causes a person’s success and happiness, and it is wisdom that is the master virtue.

Wisdom allows us to choose virtuously. The wise person chooses virtue, and virtue necessarily causes a person to be happy. Therefore, the Stoics will say that the wise person is always happy. This conclusion is what will lead the Stoics to say that the person being presently tortured on the rack can still be happy, as long as he is wise and virtuous. A person’s righteousness makes him invulnerable to chance events, fortune, or other people’s intentions. Wisdom gives one invulnerability.

Since wisdom is attainable by anyone, regardless of social status, money, or any other external factors it follows that happiness can also be attained by anyone. On the other hand, one can be born into a rich family and have access to a near infinite amount of external goods, but without wisdom and therefore virtue, they can never be considered happy or successful from a Stoic perspective.

This distinction makes it clear that it is virtue alone that is responsible for one’s happiness, not external or even bodily goods. Pain, pleasure, and other external factors are irrelevant. This is why the Stoics discount the value of wealth, health, and the like ‘so called goods’. They are not true goods, for they are neither good nor bad alone, but can be either in different circumstances. For example, wealth can be valuable if it is used for philanthropy.

If I have millions of dollars it is a good thing for me to donate a generous portion to starving children. Money though can be bad if it is used to a sinister end.

How do the Stoics reach their conclusion that pain, sorrow and death are not bad and that pleasure, wealth and health are not good; that virtue alone is the only good? The starting point is similar to that of the Epicureans, they are both looking for a primary, natural impulse and they look to animals and infants. Where the Epicureans see pleasure-seeking, Stoics see self-preservation of a natural state. On behalf of the Stoics, Cicero’s Cato says, “Every animal, as soon as it is born, is concerned with itself, and takes care to preserve itself (On Moral Ends 2.16, tr. Woolf).

The Stoics argue that we undergo pain in order to maintain a natural condition. For example, children take pains to walk bipedally in order to maintain a natural condition that corresponds with the type of being they are, humans. Stoics will say that it is a mistake to confuse their walking with pleasure. They do not walk because it pleases them; one learns to walk because it is in one’s nature to walk. This is an extremely important part of the debate because both sides rely on the primary impulse as a foundation for their philosophy. If one is able to describe accurately the primary impulse, then this stands as powerful evidence for their philosophy being the correct philosophy.

Cicero complains of the technical nature of Stoicism. The Stoics define only two things as valuable. The first is that which is in accordance with human nature, and the second is that which is conducive to achieving the first. If something is not the first or the second, it is nonvaluable or indifferent. They use the term selection, or choice, and the idea is that we select valuable things. Cato explains, “Worthy of selection, therefore, is whatever has sufficient importance to be worthy of value” (On Moral Ends 3.20, tr. Woolf). What follows is that one should only select that which is in accordance with human nature.

The next definition is appropriate action, which is a skill of selecting. The initial aim of appropriate action is the preservation of a natural condition. This is what infants or babies do. As the organism matures, the aim of appropriate action becomes selecting what is in accordance with nature. In the end, the good is seen for what it is and one then selects what is in accordance with nature for its own sake, not just for self-preservation. “At this point that which can truly be said to be good first appears and is recognized for what it is” (On Moral Ends 3.20, tr. Woolf). So here we have an account of how the aim of appropriate action changes as wisdom and life experience is gained.

An example of something that is non-valuable is knowing whether one has an even or odd number of hairs on their head or what foot someone leans on. This type of information has no intrinsic value, or even value at all. There is no utility to be gained from this knowledge, nor is there any pleasure to be gained from knowing it. On the other hand, knowing the nature of the universe, such as its size and age is valuable even though it has no utility or pleasure. It is valuable because it is in line with our nature. Human beings are naturally curious and want to ask questions and seek answers about things we do not know. This is a perfect example of how value is not contingent on utility or pleasure. True value is distinct from utility or pleasure, it is instead intrinsic.

So now we come to a crucial point of the Stoic philosophy, that is, exactly what they consider the ultimate good. We now know that appropriate action aims at selecting that which is in accordance with nature for its own sake. It is this aiming that is our natural good.

This differs from the Epicurean perspective because the Epicureans did not place value on the aiming of pleasure, but rather attaining pleasure itself as the ultimate good. But instead, the Stoics are concentrating on the aiming to virtue, and not the result or consequence of the action or choice.

Aiming in the right way and intending for the right reasons can be compared to an archer aiming at a target. The skill of the archer is not defined by a single shot. A good archer can miss one shot and still be considered good; likewise a bad archer can get lucky, shoot a bull’s-eye, and still be considered bad. For the Stoic, what matters is the skill, issued from a habit of character which is virtuous. The happy person is the one that selects correctly, with her selection stemming from wisdom.

For the Stoics, it is not the consequences of an action that matters, but rather the choosing and the intention of the choosing. Were someone to commit mass murder, and as a result laws improved that bettered society by preventing such future acts, this would still be a vicious act despite the ultimately good consequence.

Again, it is the intention that is to be looked at, and not the consequence. Even in this example, if the murderer was killing knowing that he would bring about a positive end, it would still be vicious for it is never good or in accordance with nature to have an intention to murder innocent people.

For the Stoics there is no intermediate between good and bad, just as there is no intermediate between wise and unwise, true or false, drunk and sober, or pregnant and not pregnant. It is only the wise that can be good.

Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to be wise, and this makes it difficult to find wise people. It is a very strict philosophy that treats wisdom as an ideal, similar to how we treat health. Perfect health is never truly achievable, but we aim for it as a goal. We take it as far as we can to restore our natural state. Cato supports this when he says, “To actually hit the target is, as we say, to be selected but not sought” (On Moral Ends 3.22, tr. Woolf).

The ideal is not to be sought after but selected. The perfection can never be achieved but we must select as though we are shooting for it.

For the Stoics the moral person is moral all the time, and they are indifferent to all external and bodily goods (unless they are instrumental to the virtues). They only care about mental goods: wisdom and the virtues, things worth pursuing for their own sake.

“The final aim, then, is to live consistently and harmoniously with nature. This being so, all who are wise necessarily live happy, perfect and blessed lives, with no impediment or obstacle, lacking nothing” (On Moral Ends 3.26, tr. Woolf). Stoicism offers a perfect, happy life through being wise, virtuous, and therefore in accordance with human nature. They offer a life where one can be happy and complete no matter what is occurring around them, one must only be righteous.